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Posted to the web recently Kampala — Many observers are perplexed why Nigeria, the most populous nation in Africa with fertile soils and ability to produce sufficient food to feed most of West Africa, has failed to develop and take up its potential leadership role of the African continent.
While other nations like Malaysia and Indonesia that were on the same level of development in the 1960s have used their natural resources to pull out of the camp of poor nations, Nigeria with similar resources and potential has not only failed but has retrogressed. Why? To put it bluntly, life in the Niger Delta part of Nigeria is nasty, brutish and, in most cases, short. Nations are rich and happy, not because they possess mineral or agricultural resources but because of the way they govern themselves, their education levels and industriousness of their populations. Despite oil wealth, the people of Nigeria, particularly the Niger Delta, are some of the poorest and most misruled in the world. Since oil became a major source of revenue, a combination of bad governance and greed has led to the mismanagement of the political and economic affairs of the Nigerian state that has deprived Nigerians of living the good life which their mineral wealth might have brought. The Niger Delta has reaped most of the bitter fruits of state failure to organise itself for the good of all. As Uganda prepares to extract oil, we should learn from the mistakes of Nigeria and do better. The following six factors are some of the reasons that have contributed to making Nigeria, especially the Niger Delta, fail to develop and, instead, become one of the most unwelcome places to live on this planet. Killing other industries First, the oil sector 'crowded out' other industries. As oil money began to pour into Nigeria four decades ago, economic and political mismanagement set in. The Nigerian state was not able to protect other sectors of the economy as the oil industry was developed. The country totally neglected non-oil sectors of the economy, creating room for the 'Dutch Disease' to infect the national economy.   
For example, in the period 1970-1982, as Nigerian oil production increased, its agricultural sector decreased. In that period, cocoa production fell by 43%, rubber by 29%, cotton by 65% and groundnuts by 64%. Between 1965 and 1975 when oil as a source of government revenue moved from 5% to 80%, people living below the poverty line in Nigeria increased from 28% in 1980 to 66% in 1996 (and the figure was, and is, still higher in the Niger Delta). Further, as agricultural production decreased and the population exploded to an annual level of over 2%, unemployment increased. The oil sector, which needs few workers, could absorb only a fraction of able-bodied workers. Millions of people could not participate in economic activities for lack of employment opportunities. Decreased employment led to decreasing purchasing power, which, in turn, reduced the non-oil tax base. Governments rarely prioritise sectors where they get less tax money than they spend on collection. Power through the gun Secondly, the aim of political participation shifted from serving the people to grabbing control of the state in order to use it to distribute oil money in favour of incumbent regimes.
At the regional state level, particularly in the oil producing regions, the sharing of oil resources formed the main agenda of political behaviour. At a lower level, ethnic differences were consolidated by a struggle of each group uniting to access oil resources using ethnic loyalties as a basis for consolidation. This was especially the case in the Niger Delta where the Ogoni, the Ijaw, the Itsekeri and the Urhobo and other social groups struggled to participate in the oil loot. Corruption Thirdly, corruption increased and spread from the federal government through the regional state governments to local officials. For example, Sani Abacha, who is believed to be one of the most corrupt leaders in modern times, and his family, are believed to have siphoned away some $4.5b from the country. He had no love or sympathy for his motherland. Most of his family agreed to return $2.1b after his death and some $1.2b has already been returned to the public purse. However, it is reported that his son is unwilling to do more. As corrupt people had the power of the gun, it became difficult even to talk about corruption for there was little freedom of speech. Thus even well intentioned people found themselves accepting the status quo for fear of saying or doing anything about corruption. Violence Fourthly, corruption increased the realm of violence as the control of the federal government, the state governments and the militias were dependant on the control of the means of violence, whether legitimate in the Weberian sense or not. The federal state often used the military and the police (the Nigeria Mobile Police) to legitimise itself. Between 1992 and 1994 (when Saro-Wiwa was executed), federal forces helped by oil interests conducted massive security operations that are said to have left some 40 people killed and 100,000 displaced. Between 2003 and 2004, there were many armed groups in the Niger Delta that the government had to deal with. These included the Niger Delta Peoples Volunteer Force led by Mujahid Dokubo-Asari and the Niger Delta Vigilante led by Ateke Tom, both of which were Ijaw-dominated. Environmental pollution Fifthly, oil-mining activities led to environmental degradation that further weakened the rural base of the economy and thus undermined the state.
Nigeria has recorded the worst flaring in Africa. Gas flaring is the "controlled" burning of natural gas released as a by-product during petroleum extraction. It causes emissions, contributes to acid rain, and releases carbon dioxide, which exacerbates climate changes. Oil spills also cause severe environmental damage. Between 1976 and 1996, the Nigerian Department of Petroleum Resources reported 4,835 incidents that released a cumulative spillage of almost two and half million barrels of oil. Most of the water of the Niger Delta has been polluted so much that it is not safe for human consumption and a number of aquatic life species have been killed. Environmental degradation led to less production and a rapid change in the social and economic fabric. All these curses led to the disintegration of communities, social violence and moral decay. In turn, the Nigerian state was weakened and lost ability to lead Africa effectively. Instead, the Niger Delta area is now a laboratory for all other nations to learn what the "oil curse" can do to destroy nations. Ethnicity The struggle to access oil wealth increased the consolidation of ethnic loyalties which not only competed with one another for oil loot but also for loyalty in opposition to the Nigerian state. This development was most evident in the Niger Delta where ethnic attachment became stronger than loyalty to the Nigerian state. The Ogoni who put up a rebellion from 1992-5 are a good example. The Ogoni are about 4.5 million people. Oil was discovered in Ogoniland in 1957. They claim that the federal government forced them off their land in favour of oil companies. A 1979 constitutional amendment gave the federal government full
ownership and rights to all Nigerian territory and any compensation to local
communities would be "based on the value of crops on the land at the time of
acquisition, The removal of land rights united ethnic groups and alienated them from both the federal government and oil companies. In 1992, a Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) was founded by Saro-Wiwa and others. Its target was the federal state and the Royal Dutch Shell Company. MOSOP demanded a $10 billion compensation payment for accumulated royalties, environment damages and other inconveniences. Ken Saro-Wiwa even created a flag for the Ogoni. On May 21, 1994, four pro-government chiefs were murdered and Saro-Wiwa, who was not near the scene of the crime at the time, was one of those convicted for the murder and was later executed. By mid-June of the same year, security forces had razed many Ogoni villages. Some 2,000 civilians are thought to have died and 100,000 displaced. The Ogoni troubles were later followed by the Ijaw-Itsekeri conflicts which affected both the Nigerian state and these groups as they fought each other. The Ijaw are about seven million and the Itsekeri about three quarters of a million. The latter worked with the colonial state and had a headstart in education and commerce. Another ethnic group within the Delta that competed for the resources are the Urhobo, whose numbers are almost the same as the Itsekeri. Four levels of violence occurred among these groups. These levels have included vertical violence against the Nigerian state, horizontal violence against each other, internal violence for the control of the loyalty of people within the group and greed violence for control of oil strategic areas or opportunities. Lastly, there are the armed groups whose reason for existence is to steal oil. Some of these groups work with foreign robber ship owners and are, therefore, powerful organisations to contend with. They may include organisations like the Niger Delta Volunteer Force (NDPVF) and the Niger Delta Vigilante (NDV), which purport to be working for the good of the population. The presence of a plethora of armed and often ethnically organised groups indicate the weakness of the Nigerian state in the Delta, hence the violence. The Nigerian state, desperate to destroy these groups, has often used excessive force to counter their activities. Between 2003 and 2004, the situation around Port Harcourt deteriorated considerably. On September 26, a major oil company evacuated some 235 of its workers and production in the nearby wells fell by 30,000 barrels a day. The kidnapping of foreign workers continued as late as early 2009 despite the presence of a democratic government in Abuja. Due to the corruption of its leaders, the state has no credible legitimacy to stop oil thieves. As a pirate told Alexander the Great, "Because I steal with one ship I am called a pirate and you steal with a thousand ships you are called an emperor. Is it fair? Both of us are thieves at different levels." Life in the Niger Delta is no different from what it was in the Tito Lutwa period in Uganda: insecure, unpredictable and easy to lose. A state so mismanaged as the Nigerian nation cannot protect itself against the 'Dutch Disease', cannot use its resources to develop and cannot use its potential to be a leader in Africa. Resources are only useful when well used and it takes a well-managed state to do so. The tragedy of Nigeria should be a lesson to other mineral-rich African countries. Prof Kasozi is the Executive Director of the National Council for Higher Education |
The
gun not the ballot became the means for accessing political power. Military
regimes ruled Nigeria for 23 years between 1966 and 1993.
Fossil
fuel extraction from the earth, in most cases, pollutes air, water and the
natural resource base of populations where the minerals are located. Oil is
one of the worst polluters amongst minerals extracted from the earth. It
does so through oil spills, blowouts, hydrocarbon releases, gas flaring etc.